September 17, 2026. Prepared from publications by media positioning themselves as independent of state censorship, as well as state and pro-government outlets, for the period 2020–2026, interviews with former staff, public statements by opposition leaders, and open financial reports.
Introduction: Two Crises, One Disease
In 2025–2026, the Belarusian and Russian opposition movements faced an unprecedented internal crisis. Mass departures of key staff, public mutual accusations, fights over grants, and the outflow of young people — all are symptoms of a single disease: the loss of trust in leaders and the absence of a coherent strategy. Where possible, direct quotations from primary sources are provided. Where data is based on reports citing anonymous sources, this is stated explicitly.
This piece is an institutional analysis. It is not about personalities or political positions, but about how structures in exile are organized, why they are losing people and trust, and what the crisis of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office and the crisis of the Anti-Corruption Foundation have in common.
Part I. The Belarusian Case: An Anatomy of Disintegration
1.1. Staff Erosion: From the Transitional Cabinet to the Youth Exodus
Exodus from the United Transitional Cabinet
In 2024–2026, several senior figures left the UTC, which had been established with Tsikhanouskaya’s backing.
Valery Kavaleuski, the representative for international affairs, announced his resignation on June 26, 2024. In an interview with Nasha Niva, he explained his departure by growing contradictions within the structure:
“With Olga Gorbunova, we worked together in the Cabinet on specific issues, but our proposals for reforming the UTC found no response from the leadership.”
Valery Sakhashchyk, the representative for defense and national security, left on August 1, 2024. In a comment to Pozirk, he stated:
“Contradictions have accumulated within the structure, and the leadership did not respond to them. I see no possibility of continuing work under such conditions.”
Olga Gorbunova, the representative for social affairs, and Alina Kaushyk, the representative for national revival, also left the cabinet in 2024.
In 2025–2026, three more key figures left the United Transitional Cabinet amid public scandals. All of them cited “fundamental disagreements with the leadership of Tsikhanouskaya’s structures.”
On July 30, 2026, Marharyta Varikhova, the youngest representative of the UTC, who oversaw youth policy, left the cabinet. Her departure looks different — not a rupture but a transition to the Coordination Council, where she was elected chair of the International Commission by a vote of delegates. But it was precisely this transition that exposed a systemic vulnerability: the youth portfolio turned out to be tied above all to the personality of the representative rather than to a durable institution. After Varikhova’s departure, her duties were temporarily performed by her deputy Aliaksei Hrakhouski, but a permanent succession procedure was never publicly formalized.
The Young Are Leaving: “We Decide Nothing”
The outflow of young activists — those who in 2020 were the driving force of the protests — is particularly telling.
In a 2026 study, young Belarusians admitted that they do not believe in the possibility of changing the country, do not expect justice from the state, and try not to talk about politics.
In 2025, 18-year-old Belarusians said in interviews with Deutsche Welle:
“We decide nothing. Everything happening around the opposition is some kind of game played by adults, and we are not allowed in.”
In 2026, twice as many young people (62% versus 30% in 2022) said they do not plan to leave the country — they choose survival and adaptation inside the country rather than emigration and participation in opposition projects.
This is not merely disappointment in specific leaders. It is disappointment in the model itself: young people who took to the streets in 2020 today see neither a mechanism of influence nor a space for their own participation in the structures of exile. They are leaving not for other opposition projects but for politics altogether.
1.2. The Financial Crisis: From Grants to Scandals
Tsikhanouskaya’s Admission
In 2025, Tsikhanouskaya admitted in an interview that after the cessation of US aid a “very large gap” had opened in the budget:
“We have lost a significant part of our funding. This forces us to revisit priorities and cut programs.”
The European Union planned to halve funding for Belarusian opposition structures — from 30 to 15 million euros — and the funds promised for 2026 never arrived in full. Media and human rights organizations lost up to 50% of their budgets due to cuts in US projects.
Corruption Allegations
According to a number of media reports, in August 2025 it became known that Tsikhanouskaya had received 15,000 euros from a general of the Belarusian security services and had kept silent about it for five years. This fact was actively used by critics.
In Polish media and a number of pro-Russian outlets, claims appeared that money collected by Tsikhanouskaya’s team “ended up in the pockets of associates rather than with those in need.” These claims in some cases rely on anonymous sources and are not confirmed by primary financial documents.
Western partners began cutting funding not out of nowhere — one of the reasons cited was “numerous scandals involving theft and corruption that surfaced in the opposition milieu.” Regardless of how far each individual allegation is documented, the very fact that donors cite corruption as a reason for cutting funding is an institutional signal.
1.3. Loss of Status: From Vilnius to Warsaw
Downgrade in Security
In October 2025, Lithuanian media announced a downgrade in Tsikhanouskaya’s security: “presidential status” is no longer granted, and her protection was transferred from the State Security Department’s VIP protection service to the Criminal Police Bureau.
Tsikhanouskaya’s diplomatic adviser Denis Kuchynski, in a comment to LRT.lt, stated:
“This is a technical decision that does not affect our work. We continue our activities in full.”
However, the work of the physical office in Vilnius was temporarily suspended, and part of the team was moved to remote work.
Relocation to Warsaw
In early 2026, Tsikhanouskaya’s office moved from Vilnius to Warsaw. Officially — for technical and security reasons. In fact — because of Lithuania’s inability to maintain the project at its former level and a change in US policy toward Lukashenka.
Novaya Gazeta. Europe wrote:
“The office of the leader of Belarus’s democratic forces, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, which had worked in Vilnius since 2020, is moving to Warsaw. No detailed official explanations from the Lithuanian authorities ever followed.”
Moving from a country that for five years provided asylum and a symbolic “presidential status” to a country where the terms of stay are only just being shaped is not merely a change of address. It is the loss of symbolic capital. Vilnius was the place where Tsikhanouskaya received foreign leaders and from which she addressed Belarusians. Warsaw is a new contour, where everything must be started anew, already without the previous level of diplomatic recognition.
1.4. Evolution of Rhetoric: From Caution to a Hard Line
2020: A Cautious Position on Crimea
In September 2020, Tsikhanouskaya stated in an interview with RBC:
“The annexation of Crimea by Russia contradicts international norms. But I do not want this issue to divide Belarusians. Crimea is de jure Ukrainian and de facto Russian.”
2022: The Turning Point
In an interview with Nasha Niva in 2022, she explained:
“In 2020, we were diplomatic with Russia. But after Bucha, Irpin, and Mariupol, there is no room left for diplomacy. Russia is a threat to Belarus.”
2024–2026: The Hard Line
In 2024, in an interview with Deutsche Welle, Tsikhanouskaya said:
“We always understood that Russia is an enemy of Belarus’s independence. But during the 2020 protests, we were cautious so as not to fight Russia as well. After the war, the position changed radically.”
The evolution of rhetoric is not in itself an institutional crisis. But it matters for understanding the context: a structure that in 2020 positioned itself as a broad coalition had by 2026 narrowed to a hardline anti-Russian platform. This narrowing coincided with the staff and financial disintegration. Some former associates point out that it was precisely the harshness of the rhetoric that pushed away those who saw the opposition not as an anti-Russian project but as a Belarusian national one.
Part II. The Russian Case: A Mirror Crisis
2.1. The PACE Platform: The First Split of 2026
In January 2026, the PACE Bureau approved a “platform of Russian democratic forces” — a delegation of opposition figures to work with European parliamentarians. The list included Vladimir Kara-Murza, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Lyubov Sobol, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, and others.
The ACF refused to participate, stating that the procedure for forming the platform “does not meet basic democratic principles.” This became the occasion for a public split.
Novaya Gazeta. Europe wrote:
“A split has emerged within the ranks of Russian opposition figures themselves, possibly linked to a struggle for control over the platform.”
The split around the PACE platform is telling: a structure created to represent Europe’s democratic forces immediately became a field of struggle for control. Those who were not included declared the procedure undemocratic. Those who were included did not consider it necessary to explain the selection criteria. A familiar mechanic: a closed procedure is formed, the public learns of the result, and the dissatisfied leave with public accusations.
2.2. The ACF Crisis: Zhdanov vs. Volkov
Accusations against Volkov
On May 10–11, 2026, former ACF director Ivan Zhdanov gave a series of interviews in which he accused Leonid Volkov of:
- hiring “fictitious employees” in controlled legal entities and using these schemes for personal enrichment;
- negligence with donations (including via Stripe), which led to criminal cases being opened in Russia against ACF supporters;
- departing from the principle of “don’t lie and don’t steal.”
In an interview with Meduza, Zhdanov stated:
“The ACF leadership has departed from the principles of ‘Don’t lie and don’t steal.’ I cannot remain silent about this.”
Volkov’s and Navalnaya’s Response
Volkov denied the accusations, calling them lies. Yulia Navalnaya supported Volkov and stated in a comment to Echo FM:
“Zhdanov’s dismissal from the ACF was exclusively my decision. The organization had many complaints about his work, from a complete loss of interest to sabotage of key projects.”
Irina Alleman’s Departure
At the same time, Irina Alleman, the departing host of “Popular Politics,” criticized the ACF leadership in an interview with Meduza:
“I hope my former colleagues will stop devouring each other. There is a toxic atmosphere in the foundation, and the leadership does not wish to discuss the problems that have come to a head.”
The Zhdanov–Volkov conflict structurally repeats the Tsikhanouski–office conflict. In both cases, a former senior staffer publicly accuses the leadership of violating principles and of opacity. In both cases, the leadership responds that the departure is the result of the critic’s professional failure. In both cases, third parties confirm a “toxic atmosphere.” And in both cases, the publicity of the conflict does more damage than its substance: supporters see not an examination of arguments but mutual insults.
2.3. “A Fight over a Million”: The Grant Dispute
In June 2026, media reported an internal conflict at the ACF over a $1 million grant received from American donors for election-related actions. According to sources, Yulia Navalnaya, Maria Pevchikh, and Leonid Volkov fought over the right to dispose of the money.
In RT, a Russian state media outlet, citing a source, it was written:
“One of the foundation’s leaders, Maria Pevchikh, is extremely unhappy with the actions of Yulia Navalnaya and her attempts to strengthen influence over the new ACF director.”
The conflict was described as a “large-scale management crisis.”
Information about the internal conflict over the $1 million grant relies to a significant extent on reports citing anonymous sources, including in state and pro-government media. This requires caution: such sources may be used for targeted discrediting. But regardless of the reliability of specific sums and details, the very fact of public discussion of the fight over the grant in the media inflicts institutional damage: donors who see their funds becoming the subject of internal bargaining cut funding.
Part III. Comparative Analysis: Common Patterns
3.1. Table of Parallels
| Parameter | Belarus (Tsikhanouskys) | Russia (ACF/opposition) |
|---|---|---|
| Trigger of the conflict | Staff erosion of the UTC and public accusations against the office (2024–2025) | Zhdanov’s accusations against Volkov (May 2026) |
| Key figures | Siarhei Tsikhanouski vs. Sviatlana’s office | Ivan Zhdanov vs. Leonid Volkov / Yulia Navalnaya |
| Role of former staff | Bespalov (press secretary) publishes exposés | Alleman (host) and Zhdanov (former director) criticize the leadership |
| Financial issue | Cuts in EU and US grants, reports of €15,000 from a general | Dispute over a $1 million grant, accusations of “fictitious employees” |
| Publicity | Active discussion on X (Twitter), Telegram | Broad coverage in media positioning themselves as independent and in pro-government outlets |
| Consequences | Erosion of trust, risk of split, relocation of the office to Warsaw | Split over the PACE platform, management crisis |
3.2. Five Common Patterns
Pattern 1: Personalization of Management
In both the Belarusian and Russian cases, the key problem is not a specific person but the absence of an institution. Tsikhanouskaya’s office and the ACF are built on a model in which decisions are made in a narrow circle, and the public learns only of the result. When the circle narrows to one or two people, any internal conflict turns into a public scandal, because there is no procedure through which it could be resolved internally.
Pattern 2: Opacity of Financial Flows
Both movements depend on external funding — from state donors (the US, the EU) and private donations. But in neither is there public and regular financial reporting with itemized expenses. When funding is cut and allegations of corruption multiply, the absence of transparency becomes not merely an ethical problem but an institutional vulnerability: one can only defend against accusations with reporting, and there is none.
Pattern 3: Absence of Succession Procedures
In both cases, the departure of a key figure leads to a crisis. In the UTC, Varikhova’s departure left the youth portfolio without a permanent head. In the ACF, the conflict around the new director became public. Neither structure has a public procedure: who replaces the head, how the personnel reserve is formed, how documents and contacts are handed over, who makes decisions during the transition.
Pattern 4: Outflow of Young People
Young people who in 2020 were the driving force of the protests in Belarus and the potential audience of the Russian opposition today see no space for participation in the structures of exile. They can speak out, but they do not participate in choosing the leadership, forming the budget, or setting priorities. They remain an audience, not a subject. And they leave — not for other opposition projects but for politics altogether.
Pattern 5: Loss of Donors’ Trust
In both the Belarusian and Russian cases, Western donors cut funding. The reasons cited vary — from shifting geopolitical priorities to corruption scandals. But the result is the same: a structure that loses external funding and has no internal financial base loses stability. And a structure that loses stability loses people. And the loss of people accelerates the loss of donors’ trust. A vicious circle.
Part IV. Scenarios and Conclusions
4.1. Three Scenarios
Scenario 1: Slow Disintegration (Likely)
Both movements continue to lose people and funding. Tsikhanouskaya’s office in Warsaw turns into a symbolic structure without real influence. The ACF fragments into competing factions. The young are finally disillusioned. Donors redirect funds to other projects. This scenario requires no external shocks — it develops by inertia.
Scenario 2: Reinstitutionalization (Unlikely but Possible)
One or both movements pass through the crisis and create transparent institutions: public financial reporting, open procedures for choosing the leadership, real participation of youth organizations in decision-making, separation of functions between political leadership and the executive apparatus. This requires that someone inside the structures recognize the crisis as systemic rather than personal and initiate reform. So far there are no signs of such recognition.
Scenario 3: Replacement (Possible)
In place of the disintegrating structures, new ones emerge — with different leaders, different geography, a different model. The Coordination Council in Belarus is already demonstrating an alternative model of legitimation: through a vote of delegates rather than appointment from above. In Russia, a new wave of opposition activists may form around the PACE platform or outside it. Replacement does not mean the old structures disappear — they can exist in parallel, losing influence.
4.2. What Unites Both Crises
The Belarusian and Russian oppositions in exile were created under extraordinary circumstances — mass protests, repression, forced emigration. They were formed quickly, around charismatic leaders, with no time for institutional building. This was justified in the moment. But five years later, the absence of institutions has become not a protection but a vulnerability.
Structures without transparent reporting are accused of corruption — and cannot refute it. Structures without succession procedures lose people — and cannot replace them. Structures without electoral legitimation are criticized for appointment — and cannot respond. Structures without youth participation lose the future — and cannot get it back.
The crisis is not that leaders make mistakes. The crisis is that the systems that were supposed to correct leaders’ mistakes were never built.
4.3. Limitations of the Analysis
This piece is based on open sources. A significant portion of the data on internal conflicts was obtained from departed staff and critics, which creates a risk of source monotony. Financial accusations in some cases rely on reports citing anonymous sources, including in state and pro-government media, and are not confirmed by primary documents. Psychological characterizations of public figures mentioned in related materials are hypothetical and are not clinical diagnoses.
Where sources contradict one another, preference was given to media with a confirmed reputation that position themselves as independent of state censorship. Where data is based on anonymous sources, this is explicitly stated in the text.
Conclusion
An office without a future is not an office without people. It is an office without procedures. Without reporting. Without succession. Without the participation of those for whom it exists. The Belarusian and Russian oppositions in exile have traveled the path from a symbol of protest to a structure criticized by former associates, abandoned by young activists, and cut off by donors. The mechanics of disintegration are strikingly similar in both cases — and this similarity indicates that the problem is not specific people but the model.
Until opposition structures in exile create institutions that can outlive their leaders, they will repeat the same cycle: charismatic rise, personalization of management, staff disintegration, financial scandal, loss of trust. And each successive cycle will be shorter than the previous one.
Sources
- Nasha Niva: interview with Valery Kavaleuski on his departure from the UTC
- Pozirk: comment by Valery Sakhashchyk on his resignation
- Deutsche Welle: interviews with 18-year-old Belarusians on the opposition (2025)
- Deutsche Welle: interview with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya on the loss of funding (2025)
- Novaya Gazeta. Europe: relocation of Tsikhanouskaya’s office from Vilnius to Warsaw (2026)
- LRT.lt: comment by Denis Kuchynski on the downgrade in security (2025)
- RBC: interview with Tsikhanouskaya on Crimea (September 2020)
- Nasha Niva: interview with Tsikhanouskaya on Russia as a threat (2022)
- Deutsche Welle: interview with Tsikhanouskaya on the hard line (2024)
- Novaya Gazeta. Europe: split over the PACE platform (2026)
- Meduza: interview with Ivan Zhdanov on the ACF (2026)
- Meduza: interview with Irina Alleman on the toxic atmosphere at the ACF (2026)
- Echo FM: comment by Yulia Navalnaya on Zhdanov’s dismissal (2026)
- RT: conflict at the ACF over a $1 million grant (2026)
- Meduza: Tsikhanouski fights his wife’s advisers instead of fighting Lukashenka (2025)
- Nasha Niva: Tsikhanouski’s conflict with Bespalov (2025)
- Belsat: Tsikhanouski’s escalation on social media (2026)
- ACTA FRAGILIA: “Young People Are Leaving the UTC” (2026)
- ACTA FRAGILIA: “Behavioral Models of Power and Trauma” (2026)